Analysis with PhD(c) Justinas Stankus: The Strategic Imperative for Western Engagement with Myanmar’s Democratic Forces
Author: Justinas Stankus
The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Tessera Research Collective.
Abstract:
Myanmar’s sovereignty has been fundamentally fragmented since the military coup of February 2021, leading to a complex multi-polar conflict and Balkanization of the country along ethnic and religious lines. While the military junta, enabled by China, maintains control of the capital Naypyidaw and major urban centers, recent advances by opposition forces are significant. Various democratic resistance forces, commonly identified as the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), often acting alongside established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), have seized control of substantial territory, including some border regions with India, Bangladesh, China, and Thailand. The State Administration Council (SAC) controls approximately one-third of Myanmar’s territory—primarily urban centers and strategic infrastructure—while opposition forces hold significant portions of the remainder, though estimates vary and the situation remains fluid.⁵ This creates a critical but time-sensitive window of opportunity for Western states to recalibrate their approach to this political crisis.
The stakes extend beyond Myanmar’s borders. From a human rights perspective, there exists an undeniable Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the people of Myanmar. From a geopolitical perspective, China is securing overland access to the Indian Ocean via Kyaukpyu deep-sea port with oil and gas transit capabilities, enabling it to bypass the Malacca Strait chokepoint—a critical maritime passage through which approximately 80% of China’s oil imports transit.¹ This fundamentally alters Indo-Pacific maritime dynamics as China gains an alternative trade route and establishes a permanent naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. Together with Chinese-controlled facilities in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka), this contributes significantly to the completion of the “String of Pearls” strategy—China’s network of Indian Ocean ports encircling India’s coastline.
This brief contends that supporting Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces represents both a viable policy option and a strategic imperative. Such support aligns with democratic values while serving concrete geopolitical interests—containing China’s power projection and expansion in the region. The international response has been notably restrained, often limited to diplomatic rhetoric. While the United States under the second POTUS Trump administration has noticeably reduced its political support, this creates space for other Western democracies, such as Canada, to engage substantively with Myanmar’s democratic resistance.
While ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus emphasizes Myanmar-led reconciliation, the fragmented reality on the ground renders it unclear which entity legitimately represents “Myanmar” in such processes. Western support for democratic forces can complement ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts by providing material assistance that the regional framework cannot deliver due to its non-interference constraints. Without such support, democratic forces lack negotiating leverage as the junta prepares for elections at year’s end and China continues backing military consolidation.
I. Fragmented Sovereignty and Competing Centers of Power in Post-Coup Myanmar
The Junta’s Contested Authority
Despite controlling the capital and maintaining limited international recognition, the State Administration Council (SAC) governs an increasingly hollow state with territorial control over key urban centers (e.g., capital Naypyidaw, Yangon, Mandalay) and infrastructure. Overall, this constitutes approximately one-third of Myanmar’s territory, with PDF and EAO forces holding significant portions of the remainder⁵—a dramatic erosion from the military’s pre-coup territorial dominance, whether direct or via proxies.
The junta’s international position reflects this institutional decline. While China and Russia provide diplomatic cover against meaningful Western intervention at the UN Security Council, most Western countries remain ambivalent about the question of political representation and control. Neighboring countries maintain similar positions: both India and Thailand maintain formal relationships with the SAC as the state representative body while simultaneously maintaining direct communication with insurgent groups operating along their borders. The military’s decision to end the nationwide state of emergency on July 31, 2025, while maintaining martial law in 63 townships, signaled both an attempt to project normalcy before elections and an acknowledgment of contested territorial control.
China’s Multi-Track Strategy
Beijing’s Myanmar approach differs fundamentally from India’s and Thailand’s cautious border management. With the most significant economic and geopolitical interests in Myanmar, China’s engagement extends beyond mere communication to active coordination—if not cooperation—with ethnic armed organizations. Direct SAC engagement maintains diplomatic channels and protects Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, particularly Kyaukpyu deep-sea port.² In February 2025, PRC-linked armed security contractors were deployed around this port to protect strategically important infrastructure and energy assets. This demonstrates China’s commitment to protect its investment interests in the country when the Burmese army appears to be an unreliable security guarantor, and more importantly, its ability to negotiate sovereignty exemptions.³
Simultaneously, the strongest insurgent group inside Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—a China-backed ethnic insurgency—serves as China’s primary security partner. It not only controls significant border territory but has historically supplied allied groups including the TNLA, MNDAA, and AA (collectively, Chinese-backed northern alliance forces) with military supplies—though it announced a halt to arms transfers in August 2025 following Chinese pressure.
When negotiations with Naypyidaw falter, these alternative means of pressure in the military-political nexus can be exercised. Operation 1027’s success, particularly the MNDAA’s seizure of Lashio in July-August 2024, demonstrated the capability of insurgent groups to temporarily capture and govern major urban centers. Although the city returned to SAC control on April 22, 2025, the psychological impact remains significant—it is now conceivable that insurgents could even take Mandalay, the second-largest city in the country.
This deep relationship with major EAOs contrasts sharply with India’s and Thailand’s limited engagements focused primarily on border control. Western countries appear even further removed from Myanmar’s insurgent politics.
This multi-track approach provides Beijing with strategic flexibility within Myanmar.
Democratic Resistance Consolidation
The National Unity Government (NUG), formed primarily by elected parliamentarians from the deposed National League for Democracy (NLD), has emerged as the primary umbrella institution for democratic resistance forces. Unlike previous governments-in-exile, the NUG has achieved a relatively strong degree of coordination with, and in some cases operational influence over, various PDF forces operating nationwide, numbering in the tens of thousands.⁶
PDFs represent viable partners for Western engagement. While monitoring organizations have documented some abuses by anti-military groups, these remain significantly less severe in scale and scope than the military’s systematic atrocities against civilians.⁷ This reduces reputational risk when engaging them publicly and in a more formal capacity.
II. The Cost of Strategic Inaction: Why Neutrality Favors Authoritarianism
While six original Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories—including the Karen National Union, Chin National Front, and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front—have declared the NCA void following the 2021 coup and called for international boycotts of junta-organized commemorations in October 2025, other NCA signatories have chosen a more cautious path.⁹ For example, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) has maintained dialogue with the SAC and attended the NCA’s 10th anniversary ceremony, despite initially condemning the coup.¹⁰ Some reports suggest the RCSS may be open to engaging with the junta’s political processes, reflecting calculated assessments about resource flows and political sustainability.¹¹
Unlike China-border EAOs with the ability to generate stable cash flows through cross-border sales, most democratic forces, as well as EAOs that support them, often lack such strong revenue streams. Without alternative international support and as the conflict drags on, more groups may follow the RCSS path of pragmatic accommodation.
Groups like the UWSA, TNLA, and MNDAA, similar to junta-aligned Border Guard Forces (semi-autonomous militia units nominally under SAC command but operating with substantial independence), enjoy access to natural resources, heroin and synthetic drug production facilities, and operating hubs for cybercrime and casinos for international money laundering. A notable instance of such resource sovereignty can be seen in the Kachin Independence Army, which consolidated control over rare earth extraction sites and signed supply agreements with businesses in China.
Current resistance financing depends heavily on diaspora remittances and limited cross-border trade, creating unsustainable financial pressures. The NUG’s 2024 budget of approximately $300 million, largely from bond sales to overseas Myanmar communities, pales against billions in Chinese investment flowing to areas controlled by armed groups and the military regime.⁸ This resource imbalance creates cascading effects: local PDF commanders report increasing difficulty recruiting and retaining fighters without adequate equipment and compensation. While these groups’ military capabilities remain difficult to assess precisely, the trajectory points toward gradual erosion without external support.
III. Regional Constraints and Opportunities
Precedents for Engagement
Concerns about external support disrupting regional stability must be weighed against existing realities. Multiple Western actors already maintain various forms of engagement with different Myanmar stakeholders—from economic investments to security arrangements to humanitarian operations. These were established during the Disciplined Democracy period (2011-2021) and maintained through transnational Christian organizations. Support for democratic forces can operate within this established framework of international involvement, representing adaptation to current dynamics rather than unprecedented intervention.
The principle of non-interference, while important for regional stability, has evolved in practice. Regional bodies have already endorsed humanitarian assistance and dialogue facilitation through mechanisms like ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus issued in April 2021. Since Malaysia assumed ASEAN’s chairmanship, its Minister of Foreign Affairs has visited Myanmar’s capital, but no significant breakthroughs have been reached toward peace and reconciliation.
The ASEAN Dilemma
It is worth taking seriously the most recent statement from the Malaysian Prime Minister during the ASEAN Summit between October 24-26, 2025, when he stated that the regional neighbors have “worked to foster the conditions for peace,” calling for patience, persistence, and honest appreciation of realities on the ground, guided by the Five-Point Consensus. ASEAN has sought to reduce violence and ease the humanitarian crisis, yet it is bound by its core principle of non-interference. However, the suggestion that “lasting peace cannot be imposed, it must be Myanmar owned, and Myanmar led” for reconciliation to endure is puzzling. Currently, there is no real reconciliation taking place, Chinese influence in the country exceeds that of ASEAN or any other nation, and most importantly—it remains contested which entity legitimately represents Myanmar in such processes.
The Prime Minister appears to assume the Tatmadaw (military) remains Myanmar’s legitimate government despite lacking both democratic mandate and effective control—a view rooted in traditional sovereignty norms that no longer match Myanmar’s fragmented reality. However, this is problematic in several respects. First, there is no precedent of the Burmese military making meaningful concessions that would lead the nation closer to a federal model of governance. Second—no single force currently possesses a sufficient degree of legitimacy to speak or act on behalf of Myanmar and its people; the Burmese military-led government does not have representation at the United Nations General Assembly, nor was it invited to attend the ASEAN Summit. Which entity represents “Myanmar” in this context remains contested, and letting things run their course essentially means Western powers should stand by and watch the Burmese military, while supported by China’s economic and political backing on one hand (i.e., carrot) and pressured by pro-China insurgent groups on the other (i.e., stick), gradually recapture lost towns and highways. Indeed, during the second half of 2025 they have been making relative gains, and democratic momentum is fading.
Opportunities Within Constraints
Despite ASEAN’s non-interference principle, Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship offers diplomatic opportunities. Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan’s emphasis on “comprehensive” elections signals assertive rhetoric, though newly appointed special envoy Othman Hashim focuses on “clarifying” rather than cancelling junta elections—reflecting ASEAN’s continued limitations. Any stronger response would require consensus among ASEAN members; however, they remain divided regarding Myanmar.
Western support for democratic forces can complement these regional initiatives while respecting norms of sovereignty and regional autonomy. Calibrated assistance for governance capacity, humanitarian protection, and civilian welfare aligns with internationally recognized principles already embraced by regional actors. ASEAN need not be sidestepped—rather, Western engagement can fill gaps where ASEAN’s constraints prevent effective action, acknowledging that addressing Myanmar’s crisis requires flexible interpretation of traditional diplomatic doctrines while maintaining respect for regional sensitivities.
IV. The Case for Western Engagement with Democratic Forces
Strategic Rationale
If Chinese-backed military consolidation threatens Western interests in the Indo-Pacific, mitigation requires graduated, non-confrontational engagement with democratic forces. Western states built relationships with Myanmar’s sub-national actors during the 2011-2021 “disciplined democracy” period—the quasi-civilian rule under the 2008 constitution. This includes EAOs through peacebuilding efforts (e.g., the NCA framework) and civil society networks now comprising the Civil Disobedience Movement. These foundations provide support pathways that respect China’s stated boundaries against Western interference while advancing democratic objectives.
Western failure to meaningfully engage the NUG risks condemning it to political obscurity. Following the junta’s planned elections at year’s end, the military may selectively engage opposition groups while consolidating control under a new federal arrangement that excludes genuine democratic participation. Without Western support, democratic forces lack negotiating leverage in any such arrangement. While Western governments understandably wish to maintain formal access to Naypyidaw, Yangon, and Mandalay, they can pursue two-track engagement with both SAC and NUG without extending formal diplomatic recognition to either as the sole legitimate government.
Operational Pathways
Opportunities exist for expanding humanitarian assistance, strengthening civilian protection, and providing governance support in liberated areas. Mechanisms already exist for such engagement: Thailand-based NGO channels provide access to border areas, diaspora networks facilitate financial flows, and international development organizations operate in territories outside SAC control. For example, humanitarian organizations currently deliver assistance to NUG-administered areas through cross-border operations from Thailand, demonstrating operational feasibility while maintaining distance from direct recognition issues.
However, Western governments should strengthen diplomatic ties with EAOs rather than relying solely on the NUG, which remains associated with the dissolved NLD and is perceived as ethnically Bamar-dominated. Direct engagement with major ethnic stakeholders—including the Karen, Kachin, Chin, and Shan organizations—builds broader democratic resilience while managing escalation risks. This demonstrates that support need not be military in nature to achieve strategic returns; governance capacity building, humanitarian provision, and economic development assistance can strengthen democratic forces without crossing thresholds that might trigger Chinese countermeasures.
Metrics for Success
Progress should be measured through observable indicators: percentage of territory under democratic control, number of functioning local governance structures in liberated areas, volume of cross-border humanitarian aid delivered, and level of coordination between PDFs and NUG. These metrics would provide accountability while avoiding unrealistic expectations. Currently, reliable data are limited, necessitating initial investment in monitoring infrastructure through partnerships with border-based research organizations and international monitoring bodies.
V. Risk Assessment
Western engagement with Myanmar’s democratic forces carries several risks that require mitigation strategies:
Reputational and Legal Risks: The junta and China could characterize support to PDFs as sponsoring terrorism, particularly if recipient groups commit human rights abuses with Western-provided resources. This risk can be partially mitigated through careful vetting mechanisms, conditioning assistance on adherence to international humanitarian law, and focusing support on governance, humanitarian, and dual-use rather than military capabilities. However, some reputational risk remains unavoidable.
Regional Relations: Overly visible Western support could strain relationships with ASEAN members who may view it as undermining regional frameworks or violating non-interference norms. This risk is manageable through close coordination with sympathetic ASEAN members (particularly Malaysia and Indonesia), framing assistance as humanitarian rather than political, and working through multilateral rather than unilateral channels where possible.
Chinese Retaliation: Beijing could respond to Western support for democratic forces through economic pressure against supporting states or escalated military backing for the junta. However, China’s interests in Myanmar are complex—Beijing also values stability and has hedged by maintaining relationships with multiple armed groups. Graduated Western engagement that avoids direct military support is less likely to trigger maximal Chinese responses than more aggressive interventions.
Conflict Prolongation: External support could extend the civil conflict, increasing humanitarian suffering. However, without such support, the likely outcome is not peace but rather military consolidation under Chinese patronage, potentially leading to long-term authoritarian rule and continued ethnic conflict. The question is not whether to engage in Myanmar’s crisis, but which actors to support as the conflict continues regardless.
Mission Failure: Despite Western support, democratic forces may still lose. The military maintains advantages in heavy weaponry and urban control. This risk argues for calibrated expectations and contingency planning, including maintaining channels to other actors should the balance of power shift decisively. However, even unsuccessful support for democratic forces signals Western commitment to democratic and liberal norms in the Indo-Pacific, with deterrent effects beyond Myanmar.
VI. Strategic Principles for Western Engagement
Western support for Myanmar’s democratic forces should be guided by several core principles that balance strategic objectives with operational realities:
Graduated Engagement: Support mechanisms should be calibrated to evolving circumstances rather than following a predetermined course. Initial engagement focusing on humanitarian assistance and governance capacity building, which has already been taking place, carries lower risk while establishing channels for deeper involvement should conditions warrant. More substantive support—including financial backing and diplomatic engagement with the NUG—becomes viable as democratic forces demonstrate governance capacity and territorial consolidation. The most robust forms of engagement, including formal diplomatic recognition, remain contingent on significant shifts in the balance of power or international consensus.
Multi-Track Approach: Effective engagement requires relationships with both the NUG and major EAOs rather than exclusive reliance on any single actor. The NUG’s association with the dissolved NLD and perception as Bamar-dominated necessitates direct channels to Karen, Kachin, Chin, and Shan organizations. This broader approach builds more inclusive democratic structures while respecting Myanmar’s ethnic complexity.
Complementarity with Regional Frameworks: Western engagement should complement rather than replace ASEAN initiatives. Where ASEAN’s non-interference principle creates constraints, Western action can fill gaps—particularly in providing material support that regional actors cannot. Close coordination with sympathetic ASEAN members, especially during Malaysia’s and subsequent Philippines’ chairmanship, helps navigate regional sensitivities while advancing democratic objectives.
Risk-Calibrated Implementation: The identified risks—from reputational damage to Chinese retaliation—require mitigation strategies embedded in any support framework. Conditioning assistance on adherence to international humanitarian law, working through multilateral channels where possible, and maintaining flexibility to adjust based on recipient behavior helps manage these risks without abandoning strategic objectives.
Measurable Outcomes: Accountability requires clear metrics: territorial control percentages, functioning governance structures in liberated areas, humanitarian aid volumes, and PDF-NUG coordination levels. Investment in monitoring infrastructure through partnerships with border-based organizations provides the data necessary for evidence-based policy adjustment.
Urgency Recognition: The junta’s planned year-end elections and fading democratic momentum create time sensitivity. Decisions about engagement principles and initial implementation should be finalized within the coming months to influence the political trajectory before the military claims electoral legitimacy and further consolidates its international position. The window for effective action is narrowing.
Conclusions
Myanmar’s post-coup political and social fragmentation has created a critical juncture for Western policy. The junta’s declining territorial control, combined with China’s expanding multi-track engagement, alters Southeast Asian geopolitical dynamics. Support for democratic forces from ASEAN has been muted due to internal divisions—only a handful of countries have demonstrated serious commitment to democracy and human rights in Myanmar, and the Five-Point Consensus, almost five years since being passed, is increasingly recognized as ineffective. Without calibrated Western support, democratic forces face inevitable resource depletion and eventual accommodation with the military regime—an outcome that would consolidate authoritarian rule under Chinese patronage.
The strategic implications extend beyond Myanmar. Chinese control over Kyaukpyu port enables Beijing to bypass the Malacca Strait, reshaping Indo-Pacific maritime security architecture and completing strategic encirclement of India. This represents not merely regional influence but fundamental alteration of Asian power dynamics.
As the junta’s year-end elections approach and economic pressures weigh heavily on democratic resistance forces, the window for meaningful Western involvement is rapidly narrowing. The choice is stark: provide meaningful support for Myanmar’s democratic forces, or accept authoritarian consolidation that will limit Western influence and reshape the Southeast Asian political order for the foreseeable future.
Strategic imperatives and democratic values align—making engagement not just defensible but necessary. Western states should consider expanding humanitarian assistance, building governance capacity in liberated areas, and maintaining dual-track diplomatic engagement with both the military-run government and resistance forces, in a manner similar to China’s multi-track approach. Western powers should also maintain their principled position toward the general elections at year’s end—these should not become instruments for the military’s legitimation, as such elections are neither free nor fair. This approach can sustain democratic resistance while respecting regional sensitivities, complementing rather than replacing ASEAN frameworks, and avoiding unnecessary confrontation with China. The alternative—continued rhetorical support without substantive engagement—leads predictably toward the very outcome Western policy seeks to prevent.
Glossary of Key Terms and Acronyms
AA – Arakan Army (ethnic armed organization)
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI – Belt and Road Initiative (China’s infrastructure investment program)
EAO – Ethnic Armed Organization (armed groups representing Myanmar’s ethnic minorities)
MNDAA – Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (ethnic armed organization)
NCA – Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (2015 peace framework, now largely defunct)
NLD – National League for Democracy (Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, dissolved by junta)
NUG – National Unity Government (parallel government formed by deposed elected officials)
PDF – People’s Defense Forces (pro-democracy resistance militias)
R2P – Responsibility to Protect (international norm regarding humanitarian intervention)
RCSS – Restoration Council of Shan State (ethnic armed organization)
SAC – State Administration Council (official name of military junta)
TNLA – Ta’ang National Liberation Army (ethnic armed organization)
UWSA – United Wa State Army (largest ethnic armed organization, China-backed)
Endnotes
¹ Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean,” Sept. 2024. [Link]
² China-Myanmar Economic Corridor investment figures from Myanmar Investment Commission and Chinese Ministry of Commerce joint statements, 2019–2024. (Representative official overview: SCIO/State Council Information Office)
³ Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, “China’s Economic Security Challenge: Difficulties Overcoming the Malacca Dilemma,” March 2023. [Link]
⁴ Geopolitical Monitor, “Backgrounder: Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu Port,” Sept. 2024. [Link]
⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker (drawing on BBC analysis). [Link]
⁶ PDF strength estimates compiled from NUG Defense Ministry reports, cross-referenced with monitoring organizations and NGO assessments. (Representative NUG MoD report: 2024 Military Progress Report)
⁷ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Situation of human rights in Myanmar,” 2023. (A/HRC/52/21) [Link]
⁸ NUG budget figures from Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment statements and bond prospectuses, 2023–2024. (MoPFI portal: [Link])
⁹ Six signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement—the Karen National Union, Chin National Front, All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, Pa-O National Liberation Organization, Lahu Democratic Union, and New Mon State Party Anti-Dictatorship—issued a joint declaration urging the international community to boycott the NCA’s 10th anniversary event, stating the agreement is “null and void” following the 2021 military coup. [SHAN] [The Borderlens]
¹⁰ Despite initially condemning the coup, the RCSS attended the 10th NCA anniversary ceremony in Naypyitaw and has continued political discussions with the military council’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee. [SHAN] [ISP-Myanmar]
¹¹ UWSA spokesman U Nyi Rang stated that his organization backed the junta’s elections to be held at year’s end. [SHAN] Note: While the UWSA statement is documented, reports of RCSS support for the elections are less clearly substantiated in available sources and should be verified.
